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INTRODUCTION

In 1999, the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board' and College Savings Bank2 vastly
changed the scope of intellectual property protection by effectively
immunizing states and state actors from infringement suits by individuals. The Court ruled that states could only be sued by private
plaintiffs in federal courts if Congress validly abrogated immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment, or the State had waived its immunity. The Court went on to hold that neither the Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA),' nor the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA) , were valid congressional acts to abrogate state immunity.

527 U.S. 627 (1999).
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
3 Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992).
4 Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992).
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These decisions had immediate impacts on litigants who suddenly
found that their infringement claims against state actors had evaporated. Following these decisions, lower federal courts broadly applied
the Supreme Court's holding to bar intellectual property suits against
the states. This resulted in the dismissal of a number of infringement
suits against states, public universities, and state officials. Currently,
as states and state universities delve increasingly into the commercial
domain, conflicts seem to be arising more often. In response, intellectual property rights advocates have urged congressional action to
close this loophole and strengthen the protection for intellectual
property holders. The congressional lobbying efforts came to fruition with the proposed Intellectual Property Protection Restoration
Act of 2003.5
This Comment examines the trends that have developed in the intellectual property sovereign immunity cases, outlines the proposed
and possible solutions to the loophole, and posits that perhaps the
loophole should be left alone. Part I lays the historical groundwork
regarding intellectual property protection and sovereign immunity.
Although covered thoroughly in other papers, it sets the context for
the ensuing discussion. Part II critically examines the trends that
have evolved in the state infringement cases following FloridaPrepaid
and College Savings. Among other factors, it examines the infringing
parties, the types of property infringed, the expansion of the doctrine, and waiver of immunity. Part III outlines some of the possible
remedies to the current sovereign immunity loophole. The final section discusses the possibility that constitutional, economic, and practical considerations may militate against closing the loophole.
I. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITYAND THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LOOPHOLE

The Constitution authorizes Congress to provide a limited monopoly for intellectual property creators to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' 6 This simple mechanism is intended to encourage the generation of new work by holding out protection for a
period of time to allow the author to profit from the work. 7 Federal
law protects this monopoly by granting intellectual property owners a
private right of action for infringement, dilution, or improper use of

5 S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
7 See, e.g., Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
to Intellectual
Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are IntellectualProperty Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409, 446-47 (2001) ("Intellectual prop-

erty law grants monopolies in order to provide an incentive for the creation of inventions.
These monopolies are limited, because the goal of the law is to create the incentive while imposing no higher a monopoly cost than is necessary.").
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their patents and copyrights.8 Conversely, the Eleventh Amendment
provides states a degree of immunity from suits in federal and state
courts.
Thus the central issue is whether and to what degree federal constitutional protection for state sovereign immunity should bar lawsuits
against states to settle intellectual property disputes in state and federal courts.
A. Evolution of the Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[ft] he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 9 "[The Amendment] was introduced in the Senate only two
days after the Supreme Court decided Chisholm v. Georgia,"' where
the Supreme Court ruled that a diversity plaintiff could bring suit
against a non-consenting state." Although the Chisholm decision was
applied narrowly, 2 the decision "created such a shock of surprise
throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost unani3
mously proposed, and... adopted by the legislatures of the States."
Although there is some scholarly debate, at least part of the purpose
of the Eleventh Amendment seems to have been to provide
4 states
with sovereign immunity from federal jurisdiction of lawsuits.
Although the language of the Eleventh Amendment appears to5
only prohibit suits against states under federal diversity jurisdiction,1
8 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1) (2000) (protecting against the "false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" for trademarks). Similar private rights of action also exist for patents and copyrights. Trademark protection is not derived from Article I, Section 8 authority, but stems instead from Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
10 Bd. of Public Educ. for Savannah v. Georgia, No. CV 490-101, 1990 WL 608208, at *2 n.1

(S.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1990) (ruling on a suit against Georgia for school desegregation funding).
i Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793).
1 See id. (approving diversity suits against states on very case-specific
grounds).
3 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
14 There are several distinct views on the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment.
For an excellent summary of these views, see Catherine T. Struve, Raising Arizona: Reflections on Sovereignty and the Nature of the Plaintiffin Federal Suits Against States, 61 MONT. L. REV. 105, 111 n.28
(2000). See generally Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of PersonalJurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1609-11 (2002) (introducing his discussion of the history of the varied perspectives on the Eleventh Amendment); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The ParticularlyDubious Case of
Hans v. Lousiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927,
1930-32 (2003) (explaining the Supreme Court's reliance on Hans in Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence).
15

U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("IB]y Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State ....
").
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the question of whether a citizen of a state could bring a suit against
16
his state of residence was addressed in Hans v. Louzszana. In Hans,
the plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, claimed that the Eleventh
Amendment should not apply to his claim because the Amendment's
language was expressly aimed at diversity suits. 7 The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs claim and ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment barred all diversity and non-diversity suits against the
states by private parties.'
To support its reasoning, the Court referred to Hamilton's writings in the Federalist," the proceedings of
21
2°
the Virginia convention, and Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm.
Recently, some judges, prominent academics,22 and Supreme Court
Justices have questioned the soundness and validity of the Hans deci23
sion.
24
In Edelman v. Jordan,
the Supreme Court also ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars monetary damages against the states.25 In Edel
man, the respondent sought retroactive payment of financial assistance that he and the plaintiff class did not receive due to the State's
mismanagement of its federally funded aged-and-disability-assistance
program.
The respondent argued that this was merely an equitable
repayment of funds, and the Seventh Circuit ruled in his favor using
the Ex parte Young framework, in which the Supreme Court allowed
prospective injunctions against state officials.27 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision, in relevant part, holding that, "the Eleventh
Amendment ...constitute [d] a bar to. . . retroactive payment of
[damages] .,,2" The Court, however, did recognize and implicitly reaf-

16

134 U.S. 1 (1890).

17 Id. at 10 ("In the present case the plaintiff.., contends that he, being a citizen of Louisi-

ana, is not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by the citizens of another State, or
by citizens or subjects of a foreign State.").
18Id. at 15.
19 Id. at 12-13.
20 Id. at 14.
21 Id. at 12, 16.
See supra note 14.
23 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("[lit does not take a particularly close reading of the Eleventh Amendment to see that it
stops far short of [strong sovereign immunity]."); id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[A]dditional study has made it abundantly clear that ...Hans v. Louisiana... can properly be
characterized as egregiously incorrect." (quotations omitted)); Bd. of Public Educ. for Savannah v. Georgia, No. CV 490-101, 1990 WL 608208, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1990) ("Justice
Brennan's historical analysis [casting doubt on Hans] appears flawlessly correct. ..
24 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
25 See id. at 659 ("[W]e reverse ... the Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the District
Court's order that retroactive benefits be paid by the Illinois state officials.").
26 Id. at 656.
27 Id.at 663-64. For a more complete discussion of Exparte Young, see infra part I.B.1.
28 Id. at 678.
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firmed a private party's right to prospective, injunctive relief against
state officials under Ex parte Young
B. Limits on Sovereign Immunity
Although the states enjoy wide protection under the Eleventh
Amendment and the Court cases interpreting the Amendment, there
are several notable constraints on the scope of the limits on federal
judicial power under the Eleventh Amendment protection. The
three most important of these exceptions for present purposes are
the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows for prospective injunctions
against state officials acting in their official capacity in violation of
federal law, state consent to federal suits, and Congress's power30 to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. ExparteYoung
The development of the first of these limits on sovereign immunity, the ability to seek prospective injunctions against state officials,
developed from the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young.3' In
Young, the State of Minnesota passed a series of laws aimed at restricting the amount railroads could charge for transporting freight. 32 A
group of shareholders in a large railroad company filed suit in federal court to enjoin the State Attorney General from enforcing the
law. 3 When the circuit court issued an injunction, the Attorney General challenged the injunction as a violation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.3 4 The case involved two issues-first, whether the laws the
Attorney General was seeking to enforce were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 and second, whether a federal court could val-

.9See id.
at 664 ("Petitioner concedes that Ex parte Young... is no bar to that part of the District Court'sjudgment that prospectively enjoined petitioner's predecessors...").
30There are several other limitations on and ways to circumvent state sovereign immunity.
See generally Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (holding that Congress could validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I Bankruptcy Clause authority); Nevada
v. Hall, 536 U.S. 944 (2002) (allowing suits against a state in the courts of another state); California v. Deep Sea Research, 524 U.S. 925 (1998) (denying respondent's motion to retax costs);
South Carolina v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress, under its Article I Spending
Clause power, to place conditions on providing federal funding to states). Other limitations
include suits by the United States and qui tam suits for individuals acting on behalf of the
United States.
31 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
92 Id. at 144.
.3 Id. at 143.
4 Id. at 149.
15

Id. at 143 ("It is primarily asserted ... that jurisdiction did not exist.., because there was

not the requisite diversity of citizenship ... [or a] question arising under the Constitution . . . ."). It should also be observed that there was a contention that Minnesota's law inter-

fered with interstate commerce.
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idly order an injunction against a state official. 36 The Court quickly
ruled that the state railroad regulations were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Turning to the second issue, the Court faced
the problem that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited suits against
the states, while the Fourteenth Amendment only allowed suits for
deprivations by the states.3s Although it seemed that the Eleventh
Amendment would shield a state official actin in his official capacity,
the Court held that the injunction was valid. 9 In deciding that the
federal courts could provide injunctions against state officials, the
Court adopted two seemingly disparate views. First, for the purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment, a state official who is operating under
the guise of an unconstitutional law, or is engaged in "a proceeding
without the authority of [the State] and one which does not affect the
State" will not be deemed a state actor.4 ° In effect, because the law
was unconstitutional, the state official would be deemed to be a nonstate actor. Second, for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state official enforcing the law would be deemed a state actor and
thus subject to the Fourteenth Amendment. 4' The Court also rejected the Attorney General's argument that no suit in equity could
be brought
until it was shown that there were not adequate remedies
42
at law.
More recently, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida43 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the Ex parte Young doctrine to seek
prospective injunctive relief.44 But the decision emphasized that federal courts should use prospective injunctive relief cautiously, and
only when it seemed that other adequate remedies would not serve
the purpose. 5 In essence, Seminole Tribe limited the use of prospective injunctions to those instances where a federal statute does not

.9

Id. at 149 ("The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties inter-

ested may resort to ....
37 Id. at
148.

").

M See id. at 149 ("The question that arises is whether there is a remedy [by a temporary injunction] that the parties interested may resort to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a
case involving a violation of the Federal Constitution .. .
39 Id. at
168.
40 Id. at
159.
4 See id. at 149 ("We have, therefore, upon this record the case of an unconstitutional act of
the state legislature and an intention by the Attorney General of the State to endeavor to enforce its provisions .... ").
42 See id. at 165 ("To await proceedings against the company in a state court grounded
upon
a disobedience of the act [would be a] .... risk the company ought not to be required to
take.").
4. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
44 See id. at 73 ("The situation presented here, however, is sufficiently different
from that
giving rise to the traditional Ex pane Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine.").
45 See id. at 75 ("If § 2710(d)(3) could be enforced in a suit
under Ex parte Young,
§ 2710(d) (7) would have been superfluous ... ").
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have a detailed remedial scheme.46 Unfortunately, there currently is
relatively little guidance in the opinion as to what constitutes a detailed enforcement scheme.
2. CongressionalLegislation
The second limit on sovereign immunity is Congress's power to affirmatively limit sovereign immunity by legislative action. While Congress enjoyed considerable leeway at one time to limit sovereignty using its Commerce Clause power and its enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, this ability has waned considerably in recent
decades. Currently, Congress is primarily limited to relying on the
Fourteenth Amendment.
a. Commerce Clause
An early avenue for Congress to impact state immunity was
through its Commerce Clause power. Although the Court effectively
eliminated this as an avenue for limiting sovereign immunity, the rise
and fall of this branch of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is
enlightening because it illustrates the flux that has typified this area.
The first case to squarely address Congress's ability to limit sovereign
immunity with its Commerce Clause power was Parden v. Terminal
Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department.4 7 This case was also
unique because it was the first time the Supreme Court had considered Eleventh Amendment immunity to a federal statutory claim.48
In Parden, the Court considered whether the State of Alabama could

46 See id. at 74 ("[W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for
enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside
those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young.").
47 377 U.S. 184 (1964). It could also be argued that Parden was decided on the alternative
grounds that the State consented to suit by operating an interstate railroad. The Court noted
that:
[b]y adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States empowered Congress to
create such a right of action against interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate
commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted
that condition and thus to have consented to suit.
Id. at 192.
4 See id. at 187 ("Here, for the first time in this Court, a State's
claim of immunity against
suit by an individual meets a suit brought upon a cause of action expressly created by Congress."); Brandon White, ProtectingPatent Ownersfrom Infringement by the States: Will the Intellectual
PropertyRights Restoration Act of 1999 Finally Satisfy the Court, 35 AKRON L. REV. 531, 538 (20012002) ("Parden ...was the first case claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity where the cause
of action was brought under a federal statute."). Hans was also a federal question case, but
there "the action was a contractual one based on state bond coupons, and the plaintiff sought
to invoke the federal-question jurisdiction by alleging an impairment of the obligation of contract." Parden,377 U.S. at 186-87.
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be sued by its citizens under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA).49 The Court outlined two primary questions: "(1) Did Congress in enacting the FELA intend to subject a State to suit in these
circumstances? (2) Did it have the power to do so, as against the
State's claim of immunity?"5 The Court answered both of these questions in the affirmative, first by finding the statute's broad language
included state railroads,5 ' and second, by construing Congress's
Commerce Clause power as cutting into State immunity. The Court
stated, "[w]hile a State's immunity from suit by a citizen without its
consent has been said to be rooted in ... sovereignty ... the States
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.
After Parden, the Court began to slowly back away from the notion
that Commerce Clause power could trump sovereign immunity. This
exhibited itself in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,54 where the Burger Court began to expand the sovereign immunity privilege by requiring Congress to explicitly demarcate when it wished to impinge
upon sovereign immunity. 55 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
stated that, "Congress may abrogate States' constitutionally secured
,,56
its intention unimmunity from suit in federal court only by making
The dissents in this
mistakably clear in the language of the statute.
case were notable for attacking not only the majority holding, but
also the validity of the Hans Court's interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. 57 Atascadero drastically changed the dynamics in the intellectual property arena. Prior to Atascadero, states were subject to
suit for infringing intellectual property rights, but under the Atascadero framework, they were protected because the statutes governing
intellectual property suits did not expressly subject the states to federal jurisdiction. 5 In 1989, the Commerce Clause power was upheld

49 Parden,377 U.S. at 184-85.
5 Id. at 187.
51

Id. at 187-88.

52 Id. at 191.
53 Id.

54 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
55 See id. at 243 ("[W]e hold ... that Congress must express its intention to abrogate the

Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.").
56 Id. at 242.
57 See id. at 247 (Brennan,J., dissenting); id. at 302 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); id. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The most extensive of these was Justice Brennan's "scholarly, 55-page
elaboration" of the invalidity of Hans. Id. at 243-44 n.3 (majority opinion).
SeeJacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726, 728-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(affirming dismissal of patent infringement suit against the State of Florida on a sovereign immunity basis); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 333-34 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of
patent infringement suit against State of California, which had claimed immunity).
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by the narrowest
• • of
59 margins in the plurality Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Company decision.
The Court finally closed the doors on Congress, using the Com0 In Seminole Tribe, the Court
merce Clause in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.6
considered whether Congress, under the Indian Commerce Clause in
Article I of the Constitution, could authorize an Indian tribe to sue a
state to compel negotiations. The Court ultimately overruled its recent Union Gas plurality decision and held that Congress could not
use its Article I Commerce Clause power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.6 2 The opinion did, however, recognize the
continuing viability of the Ex parte Young doctrine to seek prospective
injunctive relief63 and the ability under the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate sovereign immunity.

b. 14th Amendment, Section 5
After the demise of the Commerce Clause to limit sovereign immunity, Congress's main avenue for regulating the states is under its
Fourteenth Amendment power to enact remedial legislation. In
1997, the Supreme Court addressed Congress's power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 65 in City of Boerne v. Flores. 66 Although the decision did not directly address sovereign immunity, its
limitation on Congress's Section 5 power narrowed the primary avenues for Congress to impinge on state sovereign immunity. In Boerne,
the petitioner challenged whether the Religious Freedom Restoration

59491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). The case considered a lawsuit against a state for
toxic waste cleanup. At issue was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, which Congress passed pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Id. at 10. In
a plurality decision, the Court ruled that Congress could validly abrogate state immunity under
the Commerce Clause, and that Congress needed to clearly express its intent to abrogate in order to exercise this ability. Id. at 19, 23. The plurality was a fairly tenuous one, with Justice
White stating cryptically in his concurrence, "I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice
Brennan in Part III of his opinion, that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of his reasoning." Id. at 57.
60 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
61
62

Id. at 47.
See id. 72-73 ("The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article Ill,

and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction.").
63 See id. at 73 ("The situation presented here, however,
is sufficiently different from that
giving rise to the traditional Ex parte Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine.").
64 See id. at 65 ("Never before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds
of
Article II could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision
other than the Fourteenth Amendment.")
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Act (RFRA) was a valid use of Congress's Section 5 enforcement authority. 67 The RFRA sought to prohibit government actors from
"'substantially burden [ing]' a person's exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'"8 The
Court ruled in a 6-3 decision 9 that Congress's Section 5 power is
"remedial" and formulated a test requiring "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. 7 0 Thus, the Boerne decision established
constraints upon Section 5 power, which diminished Congress's ability to address state intellectual property infringement. For this reason, if Congress wishes to impinge upon state immunity using the
Fourteenth Amendment, it generally must support the legislation
with a record documenting both a pattern of inequitable conduct
and evidence that the legislation is tailored to eliminating this injury.
3. State Waiver of Immunity
The third relevant limit on state sovereign immunity is that states
may voluntarily (or sometimes constructively) waive their immunity to
suit. For a period, the Court held that states might be deemed to
constructively waive their immunity by partaking in activities that
would subject an ordinary person to federal jurisdiction. In Parden,
the Court ruled that "Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after the enactment of FELA,
71
necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act.
This created an idea of implied waiver where the states were viewed as
having waived their immunity by meeting the conditions of a valid
congressional regulation. Additionally, Congress had never explicitly
provided for abrogation of immunity in FELA. The doctrine of implied waiver began to crumble in Edelman v. Jordan,where the majority stated, "Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights ....72 The Court
went on to broadly state: "The mere fact that a State participates in a
program through which the Federal Government provides assistance

67 Id. at 511 (explaining the background of the case, in which a local zoning board denied
a

building permit to a church).
Id. at 515-16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1).
69Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority, which was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 511. Justice Scaliajoined much of the majority opinion. Id. Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter dissented. Id. at 544, 565-66.
70 Id. at 519-520.
71 Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
72 415 U.S. 651, 673
(1974).
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for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the
federal courts.,

73

Parden'swaiver theory suffered its ultimate demise

in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,
where the Court explicitly overturned Parden's holding for congressional intent and state waiver. 4 Thus, the current state of sovereign
immunity waiver is strict in its requirements and narrow in its scope.
First, for Congress to create State waiver, the act must clearly state intent to abrogate sovereign immunity and describe what conditions
triggers such a waiver. Additionally, this waiver must be a valid exercise of Congress's power, as discussed below. Second, states may no
longer blunder into waiving their immunity, but instead must affirmatively waive their immunity. A caveat to this, however, is that the
Court has ruled that a State's removal of a case to a federal court may
constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.7

5

Congress may

also incentivize a State to waive its immunity or to take action by exercising its power under the Spending Clause, making funding to the
on meeting certain conditions or on waiving their
states contingent
76
immunity.

C. Congress'sPassage of Acts Abrogating State Immunity from Intellectual
Property Lawsuits
Guided by the Atascadero and Union Gas decisions,77 Congress in
the early 1990's felt that it had wide leeway to enact legislation that
restricted sovereign immunity under its Commerce Clause power, as
long as the legislation was explicit in making that limitation. On this
assumption, Congress passed a series of three laws aimed at explicitly
providing the ability to sue states in federal court for intellectual
property infringement. In 1990, Congress passed the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA), which was created "[t]o amend
[federal copyright law], to clarify that States. .. are subject to suit in
Federal court by any person for infringement of copyright ... and

that all the remedies can be obtained in such suit that can be obtained in a suit against a private person or against other public entities.",7

73

In 1992, Congress passed the Trademark Remedy Clarifica-

Id.

74 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987).

It should also be noted that College Savings returned to address
Pardenone last time to affirm that the decision in its entirety was no longer good law.
75 See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) ("We conclude
that the State's action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity....").
76 SeeSouth Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-10
(1987).
77 See supraPart I.B.2.a.
78 Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990).
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tion Act (TRCA) 7 and the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA)s0. The PRCA and the TRCA used similar language stating "that States. . . are subject to suit in Federal court
by any person for infringement of [patents or trademarks], and that
all the remedies can be obtained in such suit that can be obtained in
a suit against a private entity.""'
D. The Florida Prepaid and College Savings Decisions
The Supreme Court directly addressed intellectual property and
state sovereign immunity in 1999 with the companion cases Florida
82
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank
and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postseconday Education Expense Board.3 These cases, along with Alden v. Maine,", created a new
high-water mark for the states' protection from federal intellectual
property lawsuits.
The first of these cases, FloridaPrepaid,involved a claim by the respondent that the petitioner, a Florida tuition finance entity, had infringed the patent for its financing methodology8" The respondent
brought its patent infringement claim against the State and pointed
to the PRCA as limiting sovereign immunity for Florida. s6 Florida argued that the Seminole Tribe decision rendered the PRCA "an unconstitutional attempt by Con ress to use its Article I powers to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
The bank countered that "Congress had
the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do so.""8 The
Court ultimately ruled that sovereign immunity would protect the
State from federal jurisdiction.8 9 In so ruling, the Court divided its
analysis into two parts: "first, whether Congress has 'unequivocally
expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity,' ... and second,
whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.""'8
The Court quickly concluded that Congress had expressed a clear in-

79 Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542,
106 Stat. 3567 (1992).
80 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992).
81 106 Stat. at 3567; 106 Stat.
at 4230.
82 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
83 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
84 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
In Alden, the Court ruled that Article I does not allow Congress to

abrogate non-consenting states' immunity for suits by citizens in state courts. The opinion was
also a reaffirmation of Seminole Tribe.
85 FHa. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 630.
87

Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 633.

88

Id.

89

See id. at 647-48 (holding that the states had sovereign immunity and striking down the

86

PRCA).
90 Id. at 635 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)).
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tent to abrogate state immunity9' and focused on the second and
more crucial prong of its analysis. Congress had justified the PRCA
under its Article I powers in the Patent Clause and Interstate Com92
merce Clause, and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court ruled that the Article I clauses were not valid to abrogate
state immunity after the Seminole Tribe decision. Thus, the Court focused on the merit of the Section 5 justification. In determining
whether this was a valid exercise of Section 5 power, the Court referred to its newly articulated "congruence and proportionality"9 test
and the remedial nature of Section 5 it had articulated in Boerne. 3
In ultimately determining that the PRCA failed the Boerne criteria,
the Court used several justifications. First, the Court found that Congress had not identified a pattern of wrongs that were being violated
and that the PRCA was aimed at correcting. In seeking a pattern of
wrongs, the Court defined the underlying conduct as "state infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent
owners compensation for the invasion of their patent rights."9 The
Court noted that Congress only cited two cases of patent infringement against the states, and the Federal Circuit had only cited eight
in its opinion. Second, the Court noted that there had not been a
showing that patent owners were deprived of due process of the law
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated, "[i]n procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest... is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due
process of the law." 95 The Court found that Congress had not shown
that state remedies were unavailable or ineffective, and thus had not
shown a procedural due process violation. Although noting portions
of the congressional record that showed the difficulty, cost, and lack
of uniformity of possible state actions, the Court did not seem to believe that this rose to the level of a due process violation."6 Third, the
Court found that there had been no showing of intentional or flagrant infringement by the states that was depriving intellectual property owners of their property as outlined in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that mere negligent or unintentional
infringement did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.97
Finally, given its finding of a limited showing of due process violations, the Court found the PRCA far too broad to meet the congruId.
See id. at 635-36 (enumerating the three separate constitutional justifications for Congress's actions).
93 Id. at 637-38; see supra Part I.B.2.b. (discussing the City of Boerne decision and its
impact).
94 Ha. Prepaid,527 U.S. at
640.
95 Id. at 642-43 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125
(1990)).
96 Id. at 643-45.
97 Id. at 645.
91

92
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ence and proportionality test laid out in Boerne."s Specifically, the
Court objected to the unlimited range of State conduct that could
subject the states to liability and the absence of any attempt to limit
liability to only the most egregious cases, or those that most implicated deprivation of due process rights. 99
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority was weakening the intellectual property system by encouraging
non-uniform treatment of intellectual property and creating uncertainty in the law.' 00 Justice Stevens also attacked the Court's underlying reasoning as failing to properly address the merits of the case. He
argued that the majority's opinion "has nothing to do with the facts
of this case. Instead, it relies entirely on perceived deficiencies in the
evidence reviewed by Congress before it enacted the [acts].''
He
also argued that the states were entering into the intellectual property domain more heavily than ever before, as evidenced by the number of patents and royalties they had received, and that this further
pointed to the need for congressional legislation in this area.' 2 Justice Stevens also astutely pointed out that part of the reason for Congress's light examination of the remedies available at the state level
was the huge disparity in state law. The simple fact that state jurisdiction in patent actions had been long preempted minimized the
chances that any state would have a cogent patent litigation system. °:1
Finally, Justice Stevens attacked as inherently illogical the majority's
claim that the PRCA lacked congruence and proportionality to the
harm. InsteadJustice Stevens claimed that the PRCA's abrogation of
state immunity in infringement suits was precisely congruent to the
harm of intellectual property owners having inadequate or no remedies in state courts. 104
In the companion case, College Savings, the Supreme Court examined the petitioners' claim that Florida had violated the Lanham Act
and infringed their trademark rights.'0° The bank brought its claim
pursuant to the TRCA, and again, the State claimed that it was
shielded by sovereign immunity. The bank claimed that the State

18

Id. at 646-47.

99

Id.

100Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
,01Id. at 654.
102 Id.
at 656-57. In part, Justice Stevens' comments have proven to be almost prophetic, as
many of the cases following Rorida Prepaidand College Savings appear to be the almost inevitable
result of state universities and other state entities becoming intellectual property powerhouses.
103 Id.
at 657-59. Additionally, Justice Stevens pointed out that it would have been illogical
for Congress to provide as extensive a record as the Court wanted, because the applicable judicial standard when the PRCA was passed in 1992 was far lower than it was in the post-Boerne era.
Id. at 660.
104 Id. at 661.
10,Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 671
(1999).
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had deprived it of two property rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment: "(1) a right to be free from a business competitor's
false advertising about its own product, and (2) a more generalized
right to be secure in one's business interests." 06 As an initial holding,
the Court ruled that neither of these were property rights that rose to
the level of a protected property right for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes. 07 The Court then addressed what remained of the Parden
constructive waiver theory and expressly overruled both Parden and
the doctrine."08 Finally, the Court carried over its reasoning in Florida
Prepaidand ruled that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida
was neither validly abrogated by the [PRCA], nor voluntarily waived
by the State's activities in interstate commerce .... "'09
II.

EXAMINATION OF THE CASES FOLLOWING FLORIDA PREPAID

Overall, Florida Prepaid and College Savings marked a large and
rapid diminishment of intellectual property ownership rights when
rights were infringed by state entities. The decisions left intellectual
property owners with scant recourse against states for infringement.
However, the Supreme Court had given relatively little guidance on
what recourse property owners would have, and whether their rulings
should extend to the CRCA and copyright. Additionally, the decision
brought to the forefront a somewhat subtle nuance of intellectual
property law. The real question was whether states would arm themselves with their newfound immunity to aggressively use intellectual
property.
A. The Federal Court Cases
Some of the most interesting cases following Florida Prepaid and
College Savings have occurred in the federal courts as intellectual
property owners attempt to navigate what narrow options they have
for remedies. Specifically, this Section examines what defining characteristics have emerged from the FloridaPrepaid and College Savings
decisions.
1. The ImmediateAftermath of Florida Prepaid and College Savings
When the Court decided FloridaPrepaidin 1999, a number of intellectual property infringement cases against state entities were
106

Id. at 672.

107 Id.

at 672-73.
See id. at 680 ("We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it.... Whatever may remain of
our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.").
10 Id. at 691.
0
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pending in the federal system. In the case of patent and trademark
cases, as might be expected, the decision spelled an almost certain
demise for the suits. In, Progressive Games, Inc. v. Shuffle Master, Inc., "o
the plaintiff was a gambling machine manufacturer who brought suit
against several defendants, including the Nevada Gaming Commission and other state entities, for infringing its gambling machine patents.'
In a mere two page opinion, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs claim based on the still-warm FloridaPrepaiddecision. 112
Some courts after Florida Prepaid have been hesitant to apply the
harsh new rule. In New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the University of
California,' " the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the respondent, a state university, had an invalid patent.1 4 The court
claimed that these facts differed from those in FloridaPrepaidand College Savings, because here the university was the holder of the intellectual property and not the infringer."5 The court noted that declaratory judgments were an important part of the patent process, because
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) did not subject its patents to
the "level of review and testing available in an adversary proceeding
before an Article III court ....
The court thus seemed to be implying that the patent system relies on declaratory judgments for patent invalidity and to provide a defense to infringement claims, as a
way of combating overly lax and broad patent grants from the PTO.
The court concluded that "the Regents wish to take the good without
the bad. The court can conceive of no other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or right,
while rejecting its limitations."" 7 At least one circuit has claimed that
the New Star Lasers decision was merely overruled Parden-style constructive waiver in disguise. "8
At the appellate level, several plaintiffs saw their causes of action
evaporate, while others had their rulings against state sovereigns vacated and remanded in light of FloridaPrepaid."" The first of these
11069 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (D. Nev. 1999).
I Id. at 1275.
112 Id.
113 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal.
1999).
114 Id. at
1241.
5 Id. at 1244 ("This case, however, concerns the validity of a patent owned by the Regents
themselves.").
116 Id.
117

Id.
See Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The New StarLaserscourt stated that although the Patent Remedy Act of 1992
may have failed as abrogating legislation, it succeeded as constructive waiver legislation. The
Court explicitly rejected this distinction in College Savings, stating that 'constructive waiver is littlemore than abrogation under another name.'") (citation omitted).
119 See Traci Dreher Quigley, Comment, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 Is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2013-16
(2004) (discussing briefly some of these appellate decisions).
118
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cases was Genentech v. Regents of the University of California,20 a Federal
Circuit declaratory judgment case where the plaintiff brought suit
against a defendant state university.' 2' In a broad patent dispute, the
plaintiff, a biotechnology company, sought a declaration that the university's patent was invalid and unenforceable, and, in addition, that
its patent did not infringe the university's patent.'22 In its appeal, the
university claimed that it was shielded by sovereign immunity and
thus not subject to the proceeding in federal court.' 23 The Federal
Circuit ultimately ruled that the University of California had waived
its immunity, basing its holding on "the University's voluntary and deliberate creation of a case or controversy that can be resolved only in
federal courts," and on "the University['s choice] to enter the federal
arena... [which was] within its sole control and initiative." 124 A mere
year later, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case in light
of College Savings and the demise of the implied waiver theory.125
2. The Expansion ofFlorida Prepaid to Copyright
Following Florida Prepaid, one of the largest questions remaining
was what effect the decision would have on the CRCA, the only one of
the state sovereignty abrogation statutes that the Supreme Court had
not struck down. Both the language and constitutional justification
were almost identical, and it seemed that the CRCA could not possibly survive where its two brothers had failed. Additionally, several
federal courts prior to the FloridaPrepaiddecision had already found
the CRCA invalid because it was based on Congress's Commerce
Clause power, a justification the Supreme Court had invalidated in
Seminole Tribe. 2 6 A series of cases almost immediately followed, which
grappled with the ongoing validity of the CRCA.
The first of these cases was Kennedy v. NationalJuvenile Detention Association,127 which involved a claim for copyright infringement against
a state administrative agency.2 8 The court ended up passing on the
Eleventh Amendment issue and instead ruled that the plaintiff's em-

120

143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).

121

Id. at 1448.
Id. at 1449.
Id.
Id. at 1453.

122
123
124
125

Genentech, 527 U.S. at 1031.

26 See Rainey v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F. Supp. 2d 973, 976 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that

the Eleventh Amendment bars federal copyright infringement claims against a state entity);
Jehnsen v. N.Y. State Martin Luther King, Jr., Inst. for Nonviolence, 13 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Seminole Tribe to conclude that Congress may not abrogate state immunity in copyright infringement suits using the Commerce Clause).
127 187 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999).
128

Id. at 692-93.
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ployment contract precluded his claim.29 The partially concurring
opinion, however, alluded to the recent Florida Prepaid and College
Savings decisions when discussing how the district court should determine the issue on remand.'3 ° Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit would
address this issue squarely.
Two of the final cases that were dismissed in the immediate postCollege Savings period were a pair of Fifth Circuit cases, Rodriguez v.
2 NotaTexas Commission on the Arts 3' and Chavez v. Arte Publico Press.""
bly, both of these cases considered claims for copyright infringement
against the State, and in both cases, the court addressed the issue
squarely. In Rodriguez, the first of the two opinions, the plaintiff
brought a suit against a Texas arts commission for infringing on his
design of Texas license plates. 33 In applying the Seminole 7ibe twoprong test, the court looked for an unequivocal intent by Congress to
abrogate immunity and a valid exercise of congressional power."'
The court, in a very brief opinion, found that the CRCA could not be
supported under the reasoning used in College Savings. 135
In the second case, Chavez, the court considered an author's claim
for copyright infringement against the University of Houston for publishing her book without consent and naming her as an editor in another book the university published. '

6

Although Rodriguez had been

decided in a summary decision just prior to this case, the court
wished to further delineate its reasoning for finding the CRCA to be
an unconstitutional abrogation of power.'37 Chavez and amici argued
that the CRCA was a valid abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the Due Process Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 13"The court considered the due proc-

ess issue using the Florida Prepaid rubric and examined: "1) the
nature of the injury to be remedied; 2) Congress's consideration of
the adequacy of state remedies to redress the injury; and 3) the coverage of the legislation."'' 39 Turning to the first prong, the court
looked to "the nature of the injury to be remedied and whether the
state's conduct evinced a pattern of constitutional violations." 40 The
court found that the congressional record supporting the CRCA did
129 Id. at 695 ("In accordance with general contract construction,
however, we agree with the
district court that this contract granted rights beyond those of reproduction and publication.").
130 Id. at 698 (ManionJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1.11199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000).
132 204 F.3d 601 (5th
Cir. 2000).
1'. Rodriguez, 199 F.3d
at 280.
134 Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 281 ("It is appropriate for us to adopt this analysis in the copyright context.").
I
131; Chavez, 204 F.3d
at 603.
137 Id. at 603
n.1.
'3 See id. at
604.
139 Id. at 605.
140 Id.
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not show a strong pattern of constitutional violations by the State.' 4
Turning to the second prong, the court found the CRCA record
failed to demonstrate a lack of available state remedies for copyright
infringement. 142 Next, the court considered the congruence and
proportionality of the CRCA and found that the CRCA was far too
broad an abrogation of state immunity for the rights being protected.143 Finally, the court considered the argument that the CRCA
was supported by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court
found this argument also lacking, for two reasons. First, it wrote that
if privileges and immunities "actually supported Chavez's position,
she could have claimed a deprivation... from the outset of this litigation."' 144 Second, the court felt that Chavez's attempt to use the recent Saenz v. Roe decision, a Supreme Court decision that was a fairly
unclear use of privileges and immunities, would ask too much of the
145
court at this late stage of the litigation.
It is interesting to note that both the Chavez and Rodriguez cases
paid no attention to the ninth footnote in Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion in FloridaPrepaid. Justice Stevens stated:
To the extent that the majority of this Court finds [unavailability of state
remedies and a pattern of infringement] dispositive, there is hope that
the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 may be considered "appropriate" § 5 legislation. The legislative history of that Act includes
many examples of copyright infringements by States-especially state
universities.... Perhaps most importantly, the House requested that the
Register of Copyrights prepare a study .... This report contains comments from industry groups, statistics, and legal analysis relating to copyright violations, actual and potential, by States. 146
In addition to failing to address the Florida Prepaid footnote, the
Chavez court focused heavily on congressional testimony during the
Senate Judiciary Committee's consideration of the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act. Relatively little discussion was devoted to the congressional studies supporting the CRCA when it was
passed. 147
3. The Number of Infringement Cases
In the analysis of the cases following FloridaPrepaid,I attempted to
gather as complete a sampling of federal intellectual property sover-

141

Id. at 606.

142

Id.

143 Id. at

607-08.
Id. at 608 (discussing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
145 Id.
146 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 658 n.9
(1999) (StevensJ., dissenting).
147 Chavez, 204 F.3d at 606-07.
14
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eign immunity cases as possible. In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme
Court placed special emphasis on the number of previous patent infringement cases in its examination of the congruence and proportionality of the PRCA. Specifically, it noted that "[t]he Federal Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patent-infringement suits
prosecuted against the States in the 110 years between 1880 and
1990.,,148 In the eight years following Florida Prepaidand College Sav-

ings, there have been at least twelve patent actions involving the
states. 14 It is notable, to say the least, that in an era when intellectual
property rights reached their nadir vis-A-vis sovereign immunity, more
patent lawsuits occurred in the eight years following Florida Prepaid
than had occurred during the preceding 110 years. Additionally, in
the last eight years, the federal courts have decided at least nine
copyright suits

and two trademark suits'15 involving the states. Fur-

':' FHa. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 640.
1 See generally Tegic Comm. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458
F.3d 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing whether the State's suit against cellular telephone companies for
patent infringement waived its immunity to an intervenor's declaratory suit, which sought to
invalidate the State'. patent); Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same); Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (same); State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (same); Biomedical Patent Mgmt. v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., No. C 06-00737 MHP,
2006 WL 1530177, at *1 (N.D. Cal.june 5, 2006) (same); Baum Research & Dev. Co. v. Univ. of
Mass. at Lowell, No. 1:02-CV-674, 2006 WL 461224, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2006), appeal denied 188 F. App'x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (same); Pennington Seed Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299,
No. 04-4194-CV-C-SOW, 2005 VirL 1312940, at *1 (W.D. Mo. June 1, 2005) (same); Applera
Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Conn. 2004) (same); Competitive Techs. v.
Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that, while Congress cannot abrogate sovereign immunity in patent infringement claims, the State of Illinois in this case did
waive its sovereign immunity); Syrrx, Inc. v. Oculus Pharms., Inc., No. CIV.A. 02-321-JJF, 2002
WL 1840917, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2002) (distinguishing instances where private parties induced a state entity to commit infringing acts); Progressive Games, Inc. v. Shuffle Master, Inc.,
69 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding that since the Supreme Court had held certain
provisions of the PRCA unconstitutional, states had to have waived sovereign immunity in order
for the court to have jurisdiction in a patent infringement claim against the state agency); New
Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (granting a
motion to dismiss patent infringement claims under state law for lack ofjurisdiction under the
Eleventh Amendment, but rejecting a motion to dismiss declaratory relief claims because California waived its sovereign immunity when it acquired its patent from the federal government).
1
See generally IME Adm'rs, L.L.C. v. Colorado, 146 F. App'x 281 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing
an unpublished 2000 district court case dismissing plaintiffs suit because of sovereign immunity); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the CRCA was an
improper exercise of congressional legislative power in violation of the Eleventh Amendment);
Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the CRCA
does not abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of congressional power, and that the CRCA's sovereign immunity abrogation provision may be constitutionally justified only under the Fourteenth Amendment); Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile Det.
Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of the pro se plaintiff's claim, stating
that the Lanham Act claim was misplaced); De Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F.
Supp. 2d 410 (D. P.R. 2006) (holding that it was unconstitutional for Congress to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity through passage of the CRCA); Hairston v. N.C. Agric. & Technical
State Univ., No. 1:04 CV 1203, 2005 WL 2136923, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2005) (same);
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ther, it should be noted that these figures are likely low because they
are based only on searches of commercial databases.
In 2001, to evaluate the need for congressional action, the General Accounting Office (GAO) created a report examining state intellectual property cases between 1985 and 2001.152 The report found
there had been fifty-eight such cases during this sixteen-year span and
of those suits, forty-seven were brought in federal court.153 State respondents who returned surveys for the GAO report indicated that
infringement issues were often handled through administrative channels.15 The report noted that the fifty-eight cases amounted to only
0.05% of the intellectual property suits brought during the same
time. 51 5 Nonetheless, this figure far exceeded those the, Court stated
in FloridaPrepaid.156

There may be several possible explanations for the increased
number of suits in recent years. First, the greater activity of state universities in intellectual property dealings may simply result in more
conflicts among parties. Indeed, state universities and other state research groups are developing and acquiring far more intellectual
property than they have in the past. 157 A second possibility might
simply be that, in the age of modern digital law, parties are now more

Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss
copyright claims against the defendants for interfering with the plaintiff's right to market a
documentary to which she held the copyright, and denying a motion to strike the civil rights
claims, but granting a motion to dismiss the copyright claim against certain defendants, based
on principles of sovereign immtnity); Rainey v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F. Supp. 2d 973 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (holding that the university was protected under the Eleventh Amendment from
the artwork owner's demand for monetary damages, but that the Eleventh Amendment would
not bar an action for monetary damages against a person in his individual capacity, or for injunctive relief against a defendant serving in an official capacity); Jehnsen v. N.Y. State Martin
Luther King Jr., Inst. for Nonviolence, 13 F. Supp. 2d 306 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that Congress did not have authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity for copyright cases and that
the court could only have had jurisdiction to hear the action if the state had waived sovereign
immunity).
151 See generally Idaho Potato Comm'n v. M & M Produce Farms & Sales, 95 F.
Supp. 2d 150
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the Idaho Potato Commission is an arm of the State for the purposes of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity); McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
No. 2:99-CV-1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21615, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that
the university waived its sovereign immunity when it accepted and retained a gift, gratuity, or
federal beneficence from the federal government in the form of a trademark license).
152 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. STATE IMMUNITY
IN INFRINGEACTIONS (2001). However, the GAO did note that due to settlements and limited reporting of certain matters by some courts, it was almost impossible to get a fully accurate assessment
of how many suits occurred. Id. at 7.
15 Id. at
2.
154 Id.
155 Id. at
7.
16 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 640
(1999) (identifying the minimal number of cases found to support the congressional position).
157See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 42-46 (surveying intellectual property held by the state universities); Quigley, supra note 119, at 2003-04 (outlining the degree of
state university intellectual property involvement).
MENT
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willing and more able to file lawsuits when they feel they have been
wronged. A third possible cause may be that state entities, because
they now have a clear delineation of the scope of their protection,
have become less willing to seek or accept out-of-court solutions, and
thus more cases are coming to trial. This possibility presents an interesting perverse incentive that encourages state entities to avoid
out-of-court settlements in the belief that they are shielded by sovereign immunity. Additionally, this creates the possibility of inefficiencies in the bargaining and settlement process because state entities
wield unequal power. Finally, the cause could simply be that intellectual property owners are more willing to bring infringement lawsuits
of questionable merit.
Overall, it is not clear whether any of these theories actually account for the number of lawsuits since 1999. Still, this is an interesting area to monitor because under Boerne's congruence and proportionality test, an increased number of lawsuits in this area could
legitimize a congressional act aimed at addressing Fourteenth
Amendment concerns. Indeed, one of the principal concerns of the
Florida Prepaid Court was the inadequate number of cases and intellectual property disputes supporting Congress's passage of the PRCA.
Ironically, this creates a circular logic where the Supreme Court's
visible rejection of the PRCA, based in part on too few constitutional
violations, could actually have served as an impetus in generating
enough lawsuits to legitimize congressional legislation based on the
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. This raises the specter
that the solution to the current loophole might simply be repassing
the original legislation using the increased amount of sovereign infringement cases to pass the congruence and proportionality test.
4. The State Actors Infringing

Because sovereign immunity extends to not only the State, but
also to state agencies, organizations, and officials, there is a wide spectrum of state actors who can potentially seek protection for intellectual property infringement. This Section attempts to outline a cross
section of the state actors involved in state sovereignty infringement
actions.
a. State Universities

By and large, the largest single group of infringers appears to be
state universities and similar state academic groups. Approximately
two-thirds of the post-Florida Prepaidfederal cases this Comment ex-
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amined involved a dispute with a state academic group. 158 The GAO
report found that during its sixteen-year period of examination there
was an almost even distribution between universities and other state
actors, but state universities still accounted for the majority of cases. 5 9
In Regents of the University of New Mexico v. Knight,160 the University
of New Mexico sued some of its employees for patent ownership, with
the employees making counterclaims against the university.' 6' As an
initial matter, the court decided to apply Federal Circuit law to the
dispute to help promote uniformity in the administration of patent
issues. 162 The court ruled that the university partially waived its sovereign immunity by bringing its patent ownership claim into federal
S 164
court.163 However, it found that this waiver extended
only to compul-

sory counterclaims arising from the same action.
In addition, even
though the university had amended its complaint and was not seeking money damages, the employees could seek damages in their corresponding counterclaims.' 6 5
In another patent case, Xechem International,Inc. v. University of
Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,'66 the Federal Circuit considered
whether the University of Texas was subject to a suit to change and
correct the inventorship of a patent. The dispute had arisen after
Xechem and the university had collaborated to develop a cancer
drug, and the university had later filed itself as the sole inventor with
the PTO.167 Xechem attempted to circumvent sovereign immunity by
relying on several arguments, most notably the quasi-constructive
waiver that the court embraced in New Star Lasers.'6" The court rejected this argument with little discussion as being merely constructive waiver, without discussing some of the justification the New Star
Lasers court used. 6 9 The court also pointed out that issues of patent
ownership were not preempted by the federal courts, and that such a
claim could be pursued in state court, but admitted that this did
come at the cost of uniformity and certainty in the process. 70 In an
interesting additional opinion, Judge Newman highlighted the fact
158 See Quigley, supra note 119, at 2005-16 (discussing the evolution
of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
159 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 10 (analyzing lawsuits brought
in
federal court in which state entities were defendants).
160 321 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
161

Id. at 1114-16.

164

Id. at 1123-24.
Id. at 1124.
Id.

165

Id.

162
163

166 382
167

168
169

170

F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1331.

Id.
Id. at 1332.
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that unclear ownership of a patent could actually be corrected in
state court, but that more than mere allegations of the inability to
seek redress in state courts were necessary.
She went on to state her
continuing concern about state immunity in the IP arena saying:
Respect for the principles of federalism does not automatically immunize
the state from due process considerations. The Court in Florida Prepaid
kept this door ajar. I write to the same purpose, for there is an increasing
urgency, as the states enter the private competitive arena governed by the
laws of intellectual property, to establish fair relationships and just recourse.

172

One particularly flagrant case of infringement by a university happened in Hairston v. North CarolinaAgricultural & Technical State University. 17" The plaintiff, Hairston, had taken a photograph recreating
the Greensboro lunch counter sit-in 74 with the original students who
had participated. North Carolina Agriculture & Technical University
(North Carolina A&T) then took the photograph and used it in a variety of its promotional materials, and in its football program for the
season.175 The plaintiff then sought prospective injunctive relief and
monetary damages for the copyright infringement."76 The case was
notable because it involved a copyright claim and the CRCA, and be77
cause it sought prospective relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine.
With regard to the monetary damages, the court ultimately adopted
the reasoning outlined by the Fifth Circuit in Chavez and Rodriguez,
and held that the CRCA was an unconstitutional attempt to restrict
sovereign immunity; thus, the plaintiff could not seek monetary damages. 178Turning to the prospective relief claim, the court ruled that
the use of the photos was causing ongoing damages, and therefore,
the plaintiff was eligible to seek prospective relief.
As a final matter, the court dismissed a Fifth Amendment takings claim because it
would constitute monetary
relief and would thus not fall under the Ex
80
parte Young doctrine.

Id. at 1333-34 (Newman, J., additional views).
Id. at 1335.
173 No. 1:04 CV 1203, 2005 WL 2136923, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 5, 2005).
174 See generally Smithsonian Institution Press:
Legacies, Woolworth's Lunch Counter,
Greensboro,
North
Carolina,
Site
of
a
1960
Civil
Rights
Sit-in,
http://www.smithsonianlegacies. si.edu/objectdescription.cfm?ID=42 (describing the sit-in
and the exhibit memorializing it at the Smithsonian).
175 Hairston, 2005 WL 2136923,
at *2.
176 Id. at
8.
177 See supra Part I.B. 1 (identifying the Ex parte Young doctrine).
178 Hairston, 2005 WL 2136923,
at *8.
171
172

I9ld.
180

Id. at *9.
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b. State Agencies and Who Is the Sovereign
Besides universities, semi-autonomous state agencies are usually
the other main source of intellectual property disputes within the
states. The best example of this is State Contracting & EngineeringCorporation v. Florida,"l' which involved the Florida Highway Commission
and its contractors infringing the plaintiffs patent. In Rodriguez, the
group involved was the Texas State Arts Commission. 12 In Idaho Potato Commission v. M & M ProduceFarms & Sales, 8" the Idaho Potato
Commission, an administrative agency that regulated the potato industry, entered into a trademark dispute with several potato growers.
In general, it is hard to characterize the broad group of state administrative agencies involved. One thing that they do seem to have in
common is a limited degree of public visibility and a wide degree of
autonomy within a specific functional area, such as highways, agriculture, arts, or education.
An issue that appears more often in recent cases is the question of
whether an entity can be considered part of the sovereign and
thereby enjoy the protection of the Eleventh Amendment. Currently,
this determination varies greatly from circuit to circuit. 8 4 Generally,

the resolution of the issue focuses upon how financially tied the institution is to the State, and whether state coffers would satisfy the judgment.15 It should also be noted that local governments and municipal corporations are not considered state actors.186 A problem with
the current factors-based determinations used by various circuits is
that they fail to provide a bright-line rule by which intellectual property holders may determine whether they are dealing with a state entity. As a result, property owners may be unsure of their rights both
ex ante and ex post, which can lead to owners ineffectively protecting
their intellectual property.

258 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2000).
183 95 F. Supp. 2d 150, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
184 See, e.g., De Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F. Supp. 2d 410, 412-13 (D. P.R.
181
182

2006) (determining whether an art institute and museum were arms of the State); Lambert v.
Kenner City, No. Civ.A. 04-2192, 2005 WL 53307, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2005) (determining
whether the Department of Transportation and Development was an arm of the State).
18 See, e.g.,
DeRomero, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 419 ("[T]he court must ascertain: (1) ...whether it
is structured as a separate entity such that it may sue and be sued and has a budget that is independent from the Commonwealth, (2) whether the Commonwealth has explicitly claimed or
").
disclaimed responsibility for the entity's debts ....
1 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977)
("[T]he record before us indicates that a local school board such as petitioner is more like a
county or city than it is like an arm of the State. We therefore hold that it was not entitled to
assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal courts.").
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5. DeclaratorySuits and Counterclaims

A troubling problem in the Post-Florida Savings/ College Prepaidera
is raised by the New StarLasers" decision, discussed above, where the
plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment suit seeking to have a state
university-owned patent invalidated. The description of the facts in
the case makes clear that the plaintiff was undoubtedly bringing his
declaratory suit to head off an imminent infringement suit by the
The court itself noted the role that declaratory judguniversity. 1
ments seeking invalidation of a patent can serve, as both a check on
sometimes overly broad grants by the PTO and as a defense to suit by
the rights holder.'8 9 The court ultimately ruled that the university
could not "take the good without the bad.... [The] litigant may
[not] lawfully enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or right,
while rejecting its limitations." 90 Because the logic of the New Star
decision includes some elements of constructive waiver, which was
clearly forbidden by the College Savings decision, the Federal Circuit
in Xechem International,Inc. v. University of Texas stated that the hold-

ing of New Star was clearly at odds with College Savings." Similar to
the issue in New Star, the issue before the court in Xechem was the correction of title 2for a patent that the plaintiff claimed a state university
had usurped. 19

Another example of the problem that barring declaratory suits
can cause is illustrated in Keith Shraad's testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary during its hearings regarding the
IPPRA. 93 Shraad is the Western Regional Director for National Information Consortium (NIC), a private company that focuses on developing software and database systems for state government. In
1996, NIC developed an eGovernment information system for the
State of Georgia. Over a five-year period, NIC continued to provide
support and development for the electronic system. The system apparently contributed a significant chunk of funding to the State as
well. Toward the end of the five-year period, a new information officer was appointed and proceeded to terminate NIC's relationship
with the State. When NIC attempted to negotiate a perpetual, royalty-free license for the software, the State responded that they owned

187
'88

New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1241-42.
at 1244.

189 Id.
190

Id.

Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
9.2Id. at 1326.
13 See generally Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing
Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 27-31 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Keith
Shraad, Western Regional Director, National Information Consortium).
191
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the rights to the software under the work-for-hire doctrine. Because
NIC planned to implement the same system in other states, this claim
significantly jeopardized its future business plans. When NIC attempted to settle the issue with the State, officials claimed that they
were shielded by the recent Florida Prepaid decision and thus could
not be brought to court. NIC subsequently brought a declaratory suit
to determine the ownership of the software. Georgia responded with
Although the
a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.'9
outcome of this case does not appear in judicial record, it clearly illustrates the danger that state immunity may pose in blocking declaratory suits to clarify or correct intellectual property ownership issues.
Intellectual property, especially patents, can be especially vulnerable if it appears they may overlap with another patent. For example,
in Tegic Communications Corp. v. Board of Regents of the University of Texas
System,' 95 the plaintiff, Tegic, licensed and distributed the T9 program, which is widely available on cell phones and permits users to
easily type words using the numeric keypad. 196 The university had
previously filed suit against users and distributors of the T9 software
in Texas (including Tegic's), claiming that the T9 system violated its
patent for "a method of inputting text into a device keyboard, [where
the software] recognizes the text and predicts the word the user intends to type."' 9 7 Tegic then responded by seeking a declaratory
judgment in the Western District of Washington that the university's
patent was invalid and that the T9 software did not infringe. 98 The
university moved to dismiss the declaratory suit because it was
brought by a new party (Tegic, as opposed to Tegic's customers and
distributors) and in a new venue (Washington, as opposed to Texas).
The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Tegic's declaratory suit
as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and noted that Tegic's best,
and perhaps only, option would be to attempt to intervene in the
Texas proceeding that the university had initiated. '9 While Tegic
may yet be able to raise its challenges in court, this case illustrates the
perils and difficulties that are inherent in attempting to bring a declaratory suit against states.
A related issue is whether counterclaims in suits initiated by state
actors are permissible or run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. The
Federal Circuit has ruled that when a State files suit, the State waives

M9'

See id. at 28.

195458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
196 Id. at

1337.

197 Id.
198 Id.
199

Id. at 1343-44.
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its immunity with regard to compulsory counterclaims.200 In Knight, the
defendants attempted to file counterclaims for declaration of ownership and monetary claims, such as breach of contract.20 ' The Federal
Circuit ruled that only those counterclaims which were compulsory,
the university was prediand thus arising from the same transaction
202
cating its suit on, were permissible.
These cases raise concerns about protecting the current intellectual property framework after FloridaPrepaidand College Savings. Declaratory judgments serve an important role in the intellectual property system by allowing parties to correct ownership of intellectual
property with the proper federal regulator and by getting court approval of planned intellectual property use before a party sinks capital
into an intellectual property venture. The PTO may issue patents or
trademarks that are overly broad, that may conflict somewhat with existing intellectual property, or perhaps that simply should not be
given protection. The problem then becomes: How does one defend
against a suit when a state entity uses such a patent or trademark as a
sword rather than as a shield? In defending against an infringement
claim, a valid defense is that the plaintiff's underlying intellectual
property is invalid, and thus cannot serve as the basis for the infringement claim. The question, however, is whether, after the demise of constructive waiver, intellectual property owners may affirmatively use invalidity to stave off state entities. Further, must one wait
until the State initiates an action before attempting to clarify title of
intellectual property?
•

ll

B. The State Court Cases
It is difficult to concisely characterize the state lawsuits involving
intellectual property, except to note the disparity in treatments and
remedies available among the states. The GAO report included an
illustrative set of surveys from state officials regarding the intellectual
property practices of their respective states. These surveys illustrated
a wide variance in: the ability to sue a state for an intellectual property violation (most of the respondents were protected by sovereign
immunity); the ability of state agencies to waive their immunity voluntarily (most respondents stated they were unable to do so); and what
group handled infringement issues.203 The dissent in FloridaPrepaid

also highlighted the disparate remedies for intellectual property inSee Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[W]hen a state files suit in federal court to enforce its claims to certain patents, the state shall
be considered to have consented to have litigated in the same forum all compulsory counter200

claims ..

").

202

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1126-27.

203

SeeU.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 47-65 app. 3.

201
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fringement available among states, and the fact that most states
barred suits in state courts because of sovereign immunity. 20 4 A recent case illustrating the difficulty of succeeding in a state court claim
is Smith v. Lutz,

a Texas state court case where a programmer

brought suit against the University of Texas and its officials for infringing his copyrighted software.
The plaintiff brought a triad of
claims, asserting intellectual property infringement, contract breach,
and takings. 0 7 In regard to the first two claims, the court found that
sovereign immunity shielded the university on both counts.
In regard to the takings claim, the court ruled that sovereign immunity
did not bar the claim,20

9

because "the University was acting under

color of its contractual rights [and] it did not have the requisite intent to take Smith's property by eminent domain. 2

10

While some

state laws provide a general waiver for state court claims or specific
waiver for state contract disputes, this case illustrates the difficulty facing litigants in many states.
III.

ATTEMPTS AND STRATEGIES TO CLOSE THE LOOPHOLE

A. PastAttempts to Limit Sovereign Immunity for IntellectualProperty
Following the Florida Prepaid and College Savings decisions, Con-

gress moved quickly to propose legislation to fix what it perceived as a
new hole in the intellectual property system.
1. IPPRA of 1999
The first of these attempts was the Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act (IPPRA) of 1999.211 One of the main problems with
the first version of the IPPRA was that it was overly broad. The bill
conditioned the states' ability to obtain federal intellectual property
rights on their complete waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to
intellectual property suits. If a state later breached and failed to
waive its sovereign immunity, three consequences would occur. 212

First, any pending intellectual property applications would be considered abandoned, and the state would not be able to regain them.
2W See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 655-59
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative history, including remedies, state participation, and waiver).
205 149 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2004).
206 Id. at 755.
207Id. at 756.
208Id. at 759-60.
2 Id. at 760.
210 Id. at 761.
211 S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999).
212 Id. § 113.
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Second, no damages or monetary relief could be awarded in any action to enforce a federal intellectual property right that the state obtained in the last five years. Third, the state would be barred from

obtaining any new intellectual property for one year.
The bill was an improvement over past legislation in that it did involve states waiving their immunity. However, it was problematic, in
that it was overly broad and did not adhere to the congruence and

proportionality that the Supreme Court had required in Florida Prepaid and College Savings. Ultimately this version of the bill proved to
be too strongly worded to generate enough support at the congressional committee level.
2. IPPRA of 2001 and 2003
Congress's most recent incarnation of a bill to abrogate sovereign
immunity is the IPPRA of 2003, which in many ways is a softer version of the 1999 bill. The two bills differed in that the 2003 bill was
much more specific in how it would prevent infringement, while also
limiting the aggressive tactics used in the 1999 version. The bill
stated four main purposes: to "help eliminate the unfair commercial
advantage" for the states, "promote technological innovation and artistic creation," "reaffirm the availability of prospective relief against
State officials," and "abrogate State sovereign immunity in cases
where States" infringe.1 4 The bill first seeks to address the loophole
by precluding states from obtaining monetary damages in their in-

fringement suits against individuals, unless they have waived their
sovereign immunity.2 15 Second, it seeks to provide monetary damages
to individuals in Fifth Amendment takings cases.216
Similar to the 1999 bill, however, the 2003 version does little to
limit abrogation to cases where the states have flagrantly violated intellectual property rights, such as in Hairston; cases where the State's
property right is impinging on an individual's intellectual property
right, such as in New Star Lasers- or cases where there is serious financial harm to an individual. The danger of such a broad approach is
that it opens the floodgates for litigation, which may serve as a drain
on limited state budgets and resources. Additionally, it fails to address the problem of states inadvertently infringing, either through
contractors they oversee or by using intellectual property provided by
a vendor that they believe to be non-infringing.

213
214
215

216

S. 1191,108th Cong. (2003).
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 5(b).
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B. Overview of the Strategies to Close the Loophole
In addition to the congressional attempts embodied in the IPPRA,
there are several other tactics Congress or even the courts could take
to limit the states' broad sovereign immunity in intellectual property.
1. Using Section 5 Power, or Reproposingthe CRCA, PRCA, and TRCA
The Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid ultimately rejected the
PRCA's justification on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. However,
the decision served as a roadmap for redrafting legislation based on
Section 5 power to address abuse of intellectual property by the
states. First, the Court ruled that there was not a sufficient record of
infringement actions by the states. Specifically, the Court noted that
the Federal Circuit opinion only referenced eight actions involving
the states in the previous 110 years."' This problem has been partially solved by the growth in such cases following Florida Prepaid.
Second, the Court noted the lack of tailoring in the PRCA to limit infringement to specific circumstances that constituted a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. 8 Third, the Court noted the lack of evidence
that appropriate remedies are not available at the state level.2 0 Although not extensively studied in this Comment, there has been a
growing body of intellectual property cases at the state level as well.2 0
In sum, given the growing amount of conflict with states in the intellectual property realm and the clear roadmap laid out in Florida Prepaid, it seems quite reasonable that Congress could develop appropriate legislation to address only the truly problematic cases of state
infringement.
As mentioned earlier, the amount of state infringement that has
occurred following FloridaPrepaidand College Savings, as judged by the
number of federal cases that have arisen, appears to have increased
21
substantially.
In addition, many states provide infringement remedies that are far more tenuous than those available under federal law.
In a few states, it appears that almost no remedy is available to intellectual property holders who see their property usurped by the State.
Thus, it seems that by properly documenting the increase in the
number of state infringement cases and the inequitable burden this
places on intellectual property owners, Congress may be able to re-

217 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640
(1999).
219

See id. at 646-47.
See id. at 640.

22

See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

218

supra note

152 at 17-24 (analyzing state court

claims).
221 See Section III, supra, for a discussion of the cases following FloridaPrepaid.
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propose the CRCA, PRCA, and TRCA in substantially the same form
as the original versions.
2. Ex parteYoung Precedent
As discussed below, the availability of rapid prospective injunctions can curb much of the economic and practical advantage of appropriating intellectual property. 2
By strengthening and speeding
the injunction process under Ex parte Young, it would be possible to
decrease the incentive to infringe, while also protecting state financial resources from expensive intellectual property lawsuits.
3. SpendingPower
Similar to how Congress used federal highway funds to encourage
states to raise their minimum drinking age in South Dakota v. Dole,3
Congress could "encourage" states to waive their immunity through
the use of its spending power. In Dole, Congress conditioned five
percent of South Dakota's federal highway funding on the State's
adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one. 224 A similar
scheme could be established to penalize states that commit flagrant
violations of intellectual property rights. One problem with this approach is that it could easily be applied overbroadly by Congress, possibly to the detriment of state coffers. Additionally, Congress's spending power is not without its own limitations. 225
4. OverrulingHans
Perhaps the most remote option for limiting the sovereign immunity hole for intellectual property would be arguing for Hans to be
overruled. Over the last several decades, there has been a growing

223

See Section II.C.2.a., infra.
483 U.S. 203 (1987). SeeJennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve
the Di-

lemma of State Sovereign Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DuKE L.J. 713, 740-41, 750-51

(2001) (advocating a conditional waiver plan to address the problem of intellectual property
and immunity); Zachary D. Shankman, Note, The PracticalInsignificance of College Savings Bank:
Property Rights, the Spending Power, and the Utility of a Limited Market ParticipantException to State

Immunity, 95 GEO L.J. 237, 260-67 (2006) (arguing that funding conditions can often achieve
the same results as a limited market participant exception to sovereign immunity).
24 Dole, 483 U.S. at 205-06.
25 For example, the condition of funding must be in pursuit
of the "general welfare." See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (highlighting the requirements for use of
the Spending Clause); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (requiring that the funding that is made conditional should in some way be related to the conditions); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 64041 (1937) (asserting that the conditional nature of the funding must be expressed unambiguously).
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amount of skepticism of the Supreme Court's decision in Hans.
One possibility, therefore, would be for a future Court to limit the extent of the Hans ruling and possibly readdress it without completely
upsetting the series of cases built upon it. Unfortunately, given the
strong language in the recent jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, the chances of substantially reconsidering Hans seem
unlikely at best. Additionally, a great deal of case law rests upon
Hans, and a change at this point could unravel a long chain of cases.
Nonetheless, it does seem possible that some small inroads could be
made into the large umbrella of protection that Hans provides in
Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence.
C. Argument for Not Closing the Loophole
One position that has not received a great deal of attention
among academics is that perhaps the sovereign immunity loophole is
not actually a loophole at all. Stated another way, it is not entirely
clear that the state of affairs following Florida Prepaidand College Savings necessarily calls for intervention by Congress or the courts.
There are a number of arguments for leaving the current state of
sovereign immunity intact. Some proponents of congressional action
have argued that the states may take intellectual property with few
costs or repercussions. However, it is unlikely that states would, or
even could, widely infringe or steal intellectual property. This is in
part because of economic and social factors. Because the degree of
state infringement will likely continue to be relatively minimal, it may
be desirable to not enact legislation or expand judicial remedies that
abrogate state immunity. Finally, judicial restraint may require more
time to discern whether the recent increase in state infringement
cases is part of a larger trend or merely a short-term discrepancy.
1. A Lack of PressingNeed to Close the Loophole
Numerous articles have focused on methods for closing the sovereign immunity loophole for intellectual property. 2 7 Very few have
226

See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling for the

Court to overrule Hans); Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Savannah v. Georgia, No. CV 490-101, 1990 WArL
608208, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 1990) (outlining the appeal of several critiques of Hans).
227 See Robert T. Neufeld, Closing Federalism's Loophole in Intellectual Property Rights, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1295, 1320-22 (2002) (proposing that sovereign immunity ultimately fur-

thers the intellectual property sphere); Quigley, supra note 119, at 2024-25 (proposing that the
IPPRA is constitutional because it attaches conditions to federal intellectual property protection
under Congress's Article I power); White, supra note 48, at 553-63 (articulating the view that
the IPPRA effectively balances the remedial needs of private patentees and the public policies
underlying patent law and sovereign immunity); Robert C. Wilmoth, Toward a Congruent and
ProportionalPatent Law: Redressing State Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 55 SMU L. REV. 519, 587 (2002) (urging that the IPPRA should be modified to in-
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and even fewer

have hinted that these sovereign immunity loopholes may not need
to be closed. ' Relatively few pieces have analyzed why there is a
pressing need to realign the intellectual property playing field. In
the hearings over the proposed IPPRA in 2001, Marybeth Peters, the
Register of Copyrights, openly admitted that "there are relatively few
In supinfringements of intellectual property rights by States .... ,
port of this was a GAO report under the oversight of Senator Orin
Hatch, which found only fifty-eight intellectual property infringeIt is also worthment cases since 1985 that involved state actors.
while to note that the fifty-eight lawsuits included those at both the
state and federal level and includedr- many
cases that were dismissed,
232
To support the need for the
settled, or decided in the states' favor.
IPPRA, Peters vaguely alluded to the fact that "recent experiences in
the internet environment suggest that some segments of the public
do not view copyright as sacrosanct. ,23 Finally, she claimed that, logically speaking, state actors would be more inclined to infringe on intellectual property if they faced no sanctions.3 4 What these arguments failed to consider was that state actors' actions are more
constrained than those of the general population, and that intellectual property rights holders have the ability to take actions to protect
themselves. Indeed, the GAO report on infringement stated that the
intellectual property community was "divided on what, if anything,

clude a compulsory licensing scheme, which would allow a state to enforce patent rights while
providing just compensation); Cotner, supra note 223, at 740-41 (arguing that participation in
the federal intellectual property system should be conditioned on states' waiver of sovereign
immunity); Jason Karasik, Comment, Leveling the IP Playing Field: Conditional Waiver Theory and
the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 475, 500-09
(2005) (viewing a combination of Dole, Nollan, Dolan, and other appellate court precedents as
constituting a workable constitutionality test for conditional waiver).
228 See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1448-64 (2000) (explaining that the
effects of sovereign immunity loopholes will significantly affect the United States in the international sphere);Jeffrey W. Childers, Comment, State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual
Property: Do Recent CongressionalAttempts to "Level the Playing Field" Run Afoul of Current Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence and Other Constitutional Doctrines?, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1067, 1097-113
(2004) (determining that the 2003 IPPRA conflicts with the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).
229 See generally Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006) (arguing
that sovereign immunity's impact is often exaggerated, given the other avenues available to the
federal government to achieve its policy goals).
TV Hearings, supra note 193, at 14 (statement of Marybeth
Peters, The Register of Copyrights).
231 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supranote 152,
at 2.
232

Id. at 11.

231 Hearings, supra note 193, at 15 (statement of Marybeth

rights).
234 Id.

Peters, The Register of Copy-
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rights of intellectual propstates should and could do to protect the
32 5
erty owners against state infringement.,

2. Economic and Social FactorsReducing the Ability of States to Use the
Loophole
In addition to the relatively small number of infringement cases
involving states, there are political, social, and economic considerations that limit the prospects of widespread intellectual property infringement becoming a normal practice for states. None of these factors serve as an absolute bar to state infringement of intellectual
property, but they do indicate that there may be only limited instances where willful state infringement is viable.
a. Economic Factors
From an economic perspective, there are a number of factors that
mitigate the incentives for states to infringe. States incur financial
and opportunity costs if they infringe on individuals' intellectual
property rights. First, assuming that information on state infringement is uniformly available, a State that infringes incurs future opportunity costs from lost business and technology. States constantly
use and develop technology that enjoys trademark, patent, and copyright protection. When a State infringes on intellectual property, it
will have obtained a short-term benefit, but that benefit may be far
outweighed by its long-term costs. In the most severe scenario, rights
holders may, in the future, entirely eschew dealings with state entities
that have usurped intellectual property in the past. This strategy
seems as if it could be especially applicable to certain states, which
have a strong track record of infringement. In the 2001 GAO report,
one state accounted for almost ten percent of the infringement suits
filed since 1985. 2'36 Second, it is also possible that rights holders will
seek to protect themselves by charging past infringing states higher
initial costs, in an attempt to insure themselves against the chance of
infringement. In essence, this would be a system where rights holders
self-insure, with states needing to pay a premium to obtain initial access to technology. Other rights holders may seek to protect themselves through the use of contracts with the State.237 The State would
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U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 3 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 10-11. Although the report does not indicate which state this is, based upon the

cases examined in the article, it seems most likely that Texas is the outlier state, based on its
hiqh intellectual property involvement and the Texas courts' zeal in protecting the sovereign.
3 Many states have an automatic sovereign immunity waiver for
contractual agreements and
some state courts have found an inferred waiver when states enter into contractual agreements.
See generally Menell, supra note 228, at 1413-28 (proposing a state's waiver of sovereign immu-
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thus incur the initial labor costs of negotiating the contract, and be
subject to liability for breach of contract.2 38 A final solution that

rights holders might use is relationship structuring. A rights holder
would thus seek to avoid providing the technology directly to the
State; instead the rights holder would either first provide it to private
state contractors, or, alternatively, seek to use an intermediary to provide technology to the State. Additionally, as discussed above, local
governments do not fall under the auspices of state governments, and
thus, arrangements may be made directly with local governments,
which may be sued in federal court.2 9 In either case, rights holders
would seek to help protect their property by inserting a nonsovereign
entity into the equation, which could be sued for infringe24
ment.

A second economic problem with infringing is that the rights associated with intellectual property do not carry over to the infringer
when the property is usurped. Thus, a state that chooses to appropriate intellectual property does not enjoy the full economic benefit
that accompanies the licensing or outright ownership of the property
right. A state cannot seek to license the property, it cannot defend
the property in court, it cannot claim an issued patent or trademark
conflicts with the one it is using, and it cannot build upon the property to create derivative works. With such a large portion of the rights
associated with intellectual property unavailable to infringers, state
infringement of intellectual property does not seem nearly as economically beneficial as it does at first glance. Perhaps the single most
important consideration is that the state entity does not have an assurance of how long it can continue to use the property. A state cannot plan to

use misappropriated intellectual property for an indefinite period of
time. While rights holders cannot seek monetary damages, they can
seek a prospective injunction under Ex parte Young. While this does
not present a problem for intellectual property that the states need
for only a brief period, or that has a one-time use, the vast majority of
intellectual property does not fall into this category. In the realm of
patents, biological or chemical compounds have comprised the majority of the disputed patents in suits against sovereign entities. These
compounds oftentimes merely form the building blocks for future research or for possible future medical treatments, but they offer little
benefit in the short term. In copyrights, a state can hardly expect to
reproduce and use a textbook it has not licensed in its schools, not
nity without exceptions for state intellectual property statutes, given that common law essentially gives permission to injured parties to pursue any remedies available through state law).
23%

See id. at 1425-28.

See supra Part II.A.4.b.
See State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329, 1337-40 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(declaring Florida immune from a takings claim, but holding that contractors who had misappropriated patented designs were still vulnerable).
239
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when there is the imminent possibility that an injunction will require
the State to discard the book. Perhaps the best example of a situation
in which a state entity could take intellectual property for a shortterm use was the photograph at issue in Hairston. In that case, it appears that the picture had been used only for short-term materials,
such as the program for the football season.2 4' However, this case is
the exception, not the norm. In the final calculus, only a small portion of the intellectual property spectrum lends itself to such shortterm use, and Ex parte Young enables private parties to seek prospective injunctions that limit future use. Finally, the inability of states to
extend their sovereign immunity to private and non-state actors limits
the potential utility of infringed intellectual property. For example,
while the State may appropriate intellectual property under the aegis
of sovereign immunity, it may not collaborate or share the intellectual property with entities that do not enjoy sovereign immunity. A
case that sharply illustrates this point is State Contracting,where the
court ruled that, while the plaintiff could not sue the State of Florida
for patent infringement, it could pursue a suit against subsequent
private contractors that the State worked with in using the infringed
patent.2 42 Because states often work with private entities in larger projects, the possibility of using infringing intellectual property in such
endeavors may be effectively foreclosed. Thus, for these reasons, infringed intellectual property may provide only limited benefits to the
states.
b. SociopoliticalFactors
From a social viewpoint, when states broadly steal intellectual
property, they pay a definite cost in terms of loss of goodwill and tarnishment of public perception. States themselves vie for goodwill for
a number of reasons. Goodwill can help encourage businesses and
citizens to reside in the state, which in turn generates tax revenue. In
the case of universities, goodwill helps the universities attract students
and faculty, and enables them to partner with other institutions in
education, grants, and research. Additionally, many state entities, especially universities, are entering into the commercial domain, where
goodwill translates into business relationships and sales. As this process occurs, goodwill becomes even more crucial for those state entities seeking any measure of commercial success. A good example is
universities that engage in the infringement of intellectual property.
Such universities would likely encounter a great deal of difficulty in a
number of key activities. It would be difficult for them to partner

241
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See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
See State Contracting,258 F,3d at 1340.
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with private industry groups to fund research, to attract new research
faculty, or to form partnerships with private universities.
Another mechanism of self-regulation is the power to elect new
officials. It seems that few state-elected officials would want to be
connected with the widespread infringement of intellectual property
without a justification. The election process serves as a natural system
for the citizens of a state to express their disapproval of the State
stealing intellectual property. This likely serves as a large reason why,
in the wake of FloridaPrepaid,there have been no actions directly involving publicly elected state officials.
c. Preconditionsfor Effective Economic and Social Controls

A final note on these economic and social self-regulation methods
is that many of them depend on decision makers and economic players having information about the level of state infringement. Information asymmetries, where intellectual property rights owners, the
public, and other interested parties lack information about the scope
or nature of state infringement, tend to vitiate some of the selfpolicing mechanisms described above. Intellectual property rights
groups can assist in this by publishing information on states that offend and creating methodologies for gauging the suitability of states
for intellectual property transactions. A second condition for effectiveness of these incentives is the ability of intellectual property rights
owners to discriminate against a state or state entity that infringes. If
a state is the only customer of a product, or other markets are not viable, this limits the ability of the rights holder to punish the State in
subsequent dealings for past intellectual property violations. A third
precondition is some degree of mobility in the intellectual property
market that allows rights owners to move from state to state and entity
to entity without high transition costs. This is less of a problem for
intellectual property owners who are considering whether to enter a
state's market. Despite these limitations, economic and public perceptions appear to be excellent tools to control or increase the financial consequences of intellectual property infringement by state actors.
3. Justificationsfor Leaving Current Sovereign Immunity

In addition to the control methods outlined above, there are several justifications for refraining from closing the sovereign immunity
loophole.
a. EconomicJustifications

First, from an economic perspective, it is unclear that the state
sovereignty loophole in intellectual property rights retards the "Pro-
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Put another way, the primary

purpose of protecting patents, copyrights, and, to a lesser extent,
trademarks, is to provide incentive to intellectual property creators by
enabling them to recover the costs of creating the intellectual property,24" and it is unclear whether current state infringement has an
appreciable effect on reducing the creation of intellectual property.
It is helpful to illustrate this point with a simple equation recently
stated by Professor Landes and Judge Posner. They stated that to
promote economic efficiency, intellectual property law should seek to
"maximize the benefits from creating additional works minus both
the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering [intellectual property] protection.,

245

Benefits in this equation are not the

benefits to the intellectual property creator alone, but rather to society, including the intellectual property creator. Economically, the
purpose of intellectual property law is not to encourage every possible piece of intellectual property to be created, but rather, to maximize the benefits of intellectual property (which are a factor of both
the amount of intellectual property and the social benefit of each
piece of intellectual property) above the costs associated with protecting or overprotecting the property. As a corollary, because longer
and broader production of intellectual property results in increasing
marginal costs and decreasing marginal incentives to create intellectual property, the optimal protection is not a complete and infinite
protection of intellectual property. Instead, optimal protection is
limited in scope and duration to some degree.
Focusing on the benefits, it seems that state infringement will
generally have relatively little limiting effect on the benefits to intellectual property creators. First, few types of intellectual property are
sold in a market comprised exclusively of state actors. Thus, while infringement by states may lessen the benefits that accrue to an intellectual property creator somewhat, this effect would be limited by all
the private consumers of the intellectual property who do not infringe. To use a simple example from Hairston, although the market for the photographer's photo of the lunch counter sit-in could be
243

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8,

cl.8.

See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (noting that the copyright law provides incentives for people to
create by allowing them to recover the high cost of creating the work); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) ("On this view, the proper
goal of intellectual property law is to give as little protection as possible consistent with encouraging innovation.").
245 Landes & Posner, supra note 244, at 326; see also Stanley
M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991) (stating that intellectual property protection should "maximize the difference between the value of
the intellectual property that is created and used and the social cost of its creation . . ").
246 Hairston v. N.C. Agric. & Technical State Univ., No. 1:04 CV 1203, 2005 WIL 2136923, at
2

*1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2005).
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sold or licensed to many individuals, it is likely that only a miniscule
portion of that market is composed of state actors, such as North
Carolina A&T. Thus, it seems that few, if any, intellectual property
owners should expect their profits to be reduced to the point where it
would not be profitable or reasonable to create the intellectual property. Additionally, intellectual property owners' decisions to create
intellectual property are based on their ex ante view of the market and
of the legal protection afforded their intellectual property. It is difficult to argue, given the limited amount of state infringement as compared to the aggregate amounts of infringement by the public, that
intellectual property owners should or would anticipate a reduction
in their profit because of state infringement.2 47 A second way intellectual property infringement can reduce the creator's profits is if copies
of the intellectual property are created and sold. 48 State infringers
do not present a significant problem in this respect, for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the possibility of Ex parte Young injunctions limits the ability of state actors to widely distribute copies of
intellectual property. Second, it seems unlikely, if not impossible,
that states would even begin to, or could effectively, copy and distribute intellectual property. Thus, state infringement, while perhaps
morally troublesome, will not likely have a negative impact on the
underlying goal of intellectual property law-encouraging the creation of intellectual property works. Indeed, it has been suggested
that some degree of "free riding" may even increase social welfare
when it does not reduce the incentive to create, by helping to increase the positive externalities of the intellectual property through
broader public use and access.24 9
A second, related reason for allowing state sovereignty to remain
is that it serves as a method to combat bargaining inequalities that
may arise when intellectual property has a broad public benefit or
strong positive externalities. To put it another way, bargaining may
break down when a technology has broad benefits for the public, but
for which states have trouble charging taxpayers,2 50 and the property

owner charges a price far higher than what states can afford but less
than the aggregate benefit provided to taxpayers. In such a case, negotiations will often break down, and the economically efficient sale
of the property does not occur. Another example of breakdown occurs when the State deals with a monopolistic intellectual property
247

This ex ante argument also helps mitigate possible consequences where a large portion of

the market is comprised of state actors, for example in State Contractors, where the intellectual
property at stake was a paving technology that was used primarily in contracts with state actors.
248 Landes & Posner, supra note 244, at 333-34. This is assuming, among other things, that
the copies are identical and serve as market substitutes for the creator's work.
249 See Lemley, supra note 244 (arguing that intellectual
property should not be treated as
ordinary property, in which free-riding is forbidden by law).
2-o Classical examples of this might be cleaner air, more efficient waste
disposal, etc.
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owner who attempts
S • 251 to charge the states more than the normal marIn these cases, economic efficiency dictates that
price.
ket-clearing
the transaction should occur but, for extraneous reasons, it does not.
State sovereignty could serve as a valuable tool for increasing state
bargaining power in such situations or for allowing the economically
efficient outcome to occur. While this smacks of potential abusive
behavior by the states, the greater good may be achieved in situations
where the intellectual property owner is acting in an especially anticompetitive, deceptive, or monopolistic manner. Thus the theory
could be used in moderation to improve the aggregate social welfare.
While such actions would have to be limited properly, broad, sweeping abrogation remedies entirely foreclose this beneficial possibility.
b. Policy Justifications
From a policy view, wide-sweeping programs aimed at limiting intellectual property infringement by the states tend to be over inclusive, as the CRCA, PRCA, TRCA, and IPPRA illustrate. The main
problem with these overly broad programs is that they fail to consider
the impact they may have on limited state funds when a flood of intellectual property litigation hits the states. While some might argue
that states can simply avoid infringing if they wish to avoid lawsuits,
this oversimplifies the structure of state governance. States use intellectual property from a variety of sources, and the branches of state
government, particularly universities and certain commissions, operate with a large degree of leeway. As many of the cases since 1999 illustrate, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to ensure that no
branches are infringing intellectual property, 25 and even so, conflicts
This would occur primarily if there are no substitute goods for the one being offered, and
the State would incur significant costs in not using the intellectual property. This can often occur with software.
2
See generally Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (suit by biopharmaceutical company against university research center); Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim by state university
against inventors of chemical compounds); State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (suit by highway construction corporations against state and stateemployed private contractors); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000)
(claim by author against public university and its employees); Rodriguez v. Tex. Comm'n on the
Arts, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (claim by license plate artist against state arts commission for
misappropriation); Kennedy v. Nat'lJuvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999); Hairston
v. N.C. Agric. & Technical State Univ., No. 1:04 CV 1203, 2005 WL 2136923, at *1 (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 5, 2005) (claim by photographer against state university); Pennington Seed Inc. v. Produce
Exch. No. 299, No. 04-494-CV-C-SOW, 2005 WL 1312940, at *1 (W.D. Mo.June 1, 2005) (suit by
corporation against state university); Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.
Conn. 2004) (suit by owner of a patent for complex chemical lab equipment against competitor
corporation); Competitive Techs. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (claim
by state university against manufacturer of plasma display panels); Syrrx, Inc. v. Oculus Pharms.,
Inc., No. CJV.A 02-321-JJF, 2002 WL 1840917, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 9, 2002) (claim by chemical
manufacturer against competitor corporation for inducing a state university to infringe a pat2
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over licensing and ownership will naturally occur when states are actively using and developing intellectual property.253 It is questionable
whether we should shift the costs of these sometimes-unavoidable
suits onto the states, and it seems almost certain that to swing the
proverbial barn doors all the way open is to invite very costly litigation
on the states. Another problem with over-inclusive legislation is that
it discourages some intellectual property uses that economic efficiency would otherwise encourage.
A second danger in broad, sweeping abrogation with intellectual
property is that it weakens state rights not only with respect to intellectual property, but may also tend to usher broad abrogation of
states' rights in other areas. If such a simple solution as carte blanche
abrogation were to be used, it seems likely that the same tactic could
be used in other areas that have rights created by federal law. This
includes many of the federal discrimination and disability laws.
While these federally created remedies are undoubtedly good policies, state coffers could be drained quickly by such litigation. For
in several
similar reasons,
2 54 the federal government enjoys immunity
areas as well.

A third policy reason for not abrogating is that immunity may
serve as a counterbalance for states against the continued extension
of intellectual property protection periods, especially in the realm of
copyright. While the Constitution provides that Congress may protect intellectual property for a limited time, there has been a steady
increase in the length of terms of protection for copyrights, culminating in the current lifetime-plus-seventy-years regime for individuals.255
Regardless of the debate over whether this overreaches what the Constitution intended, the current terms protect the vast number of copyrights and patents far beyond their period of economic usefulness.
While there are certain exceptions to copyright protection under the
fair use doctrine and for archival purposes, state immunity could

ent); New Star Lasers, Inc., v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(claim by state university that its patent was valid).
23 See generally State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Florida, 258 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that private contractors who misappropriated patented designs at direction of the
State were vulnerable to suit); Genentech v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (addressing a claim by a biotechnology company against state university and university's licensee).
24 See Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and IntellectualProperty, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1165
(2000) (arguing that because the federal government enjoys immunity in intellectual property
suits, state governments should have a similar privilege).
255 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
256 See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 72 (Comm. Print
1958) (stating that patented inventions are often not useful for the entire patent term); Shawn
W. Potter, Opening Up to Open Source, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 24 (2000) ("In comparison to the
copyright term, the useful economic life of a software product is much shorter.").
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serve as a useful tool for increasing the use of intellectual property.
This would both enable the continued use of intellectual property of
waning economic value and, especially in the case of copyrighted materials, could ensure that material is not lost over time. The possible
benefit of this is limited by the ability to seek prospective injunctions
under Ex parte Young, but in cases where property owners were no
longer using the property, and thus would not seek an injunction, it
could serve as a way to preserve writings and other artistic works.
Thus in a sense, sovereign immunity could serve, at least for copyrights, as a valuable pressure release for the problems of information
loss and public knowledge that necessarily arise from everlengthening copyright terms.
CONCLUSION

In the eight years following FloridaPrepaidand College Savings, the
federal cases have further delineated the boundaries of broader state
sovereign immunity in the intellectual property area. Despite the
growing number of intellectual property actions involving states,
there are still many questions that remain to be answered, including
the use of preemptive declaratory suits to defend against impending
state lawsuits, the protection states will be afforded when they flagrantly infringe on intellectual property, and the extent to which intellectual property owners can protect themselves from state infringement. At this stage, it is still too early to determine whether
extensive congressional legislation is needed in this area. A strong
argument exists, based on economic, self-help, and policy considerations, that the loophole should not be closed. At the very least, broad
congressional legislation, such as the IPPRA or blanket waivers of sovereign immunity, most likely will cause a great deal of financial harm
to the states, while perhaps providing only a small or negligible increase in social benefit and protection to intellectual property owners
and creators. Thus, the best course moving forward would be for
Congress to refrain from broadly legislating to close the loophole.

